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CHAPTER 7

National Legislatures in Common Markets:
Autonomy in the European Union and Mercosur
FRANCESCO DUINA

In all cases, whilst the government subsists, the legislative is the
supreme power, for what can give laws to another, must needs be
superior to him.
—John Locke, Second Treatise of Government

CLASSICAL AND contemporary scholars have described in great detail
the multifaceted and intimate relationship between early capitalist economies and nation-states.1 Despite their varying views on the nature of
that relationship, most scholars have seen the nation-state as a stable
and legitimate form of political organization during that period. The
arrival of supranational economies, whether on a global or a regional
scale, has spurred a heated debate about the continuing stability of nation-states. Numerous scholars have argued for an inevitable decline of
the nation-state; others have posited an opposite, strengthening trend.
In most cases, the evidence has concerned only some of the key facets of
the relationship between supranational economies and nation-states.
This chapter expands our understanding of that relationship by examining the impact of common markets, the European Union (EU) and
Mercosur in particular, on the autonomy of national legislatures. In line
with the arguments of Rudra Sil and others in this volume, the findings
paint a complex picture of change. The legal systems of common markets deprive national legislatures of control over numerous areas related
to the trade of goods and, through time, some areas seemingly unrelated
1

John A. Hall and John G. Ikenberry, The State (Milton Keynes: Open University Press,
1989); Michael Mann, States, War, and Capitalism: Studies in Political Sociology (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988); Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (New York: International Publishers, 1970); Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and
European States, AD 990-1990 (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1990); Max Weber,
Economy and Society (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968).
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to the objectives of common markets, such as the environment. But,
unpredictably, national legislatures retain significant control over numerous aspects of services, labor, and capital, despite the centrality of
those areas to common markets. Moreover, they retain undisputed control over numerous other areas, such as culture and education. We notice, in addition, that the drivers of these observable trends, which include an internal logic of spillover but also the protectionist tendencies
of member states in areas such as banking, are complex and often contradictory. Rather than necessitating the decommissioning of national
legislatures, then, the arrival of common markets may be giving rise to
an enduring division of labor between the supranational and national
levels. In the conclusion, we contemplate whether such a change might
entail, at the same time, a parallel strengthening of the national executive branch and other national functions.

EXISTING ANALYSES OF STATE AUTONOMY
IN SUPRANATIONAL ECONOMIES
Scholars have generally formulated polarized conclusions about the impact of supranational economies on the autonomy of nation-states. In
most cases, as John Campbell notes in his contribution to this volume,
only the most obvious facets of that relationship have come under consideration. Typically, attention has turned to the continuing ability of
states (more specifically, though often not specified, of the executive and
legislative branches) to engage freely in decision making activities (policy making for executives, law making for legislators) in very specific
areas of economic life.
When thinking of the global economy, scholars have primarily focused on states and decision making with regard to exchange measures,
multinational corporations, and macroeconomic problems such as unemployment, inflation, and subsidies. Those proposing the decline of
nation-states have accordingly described how states no longer control
exchange measures such as tariffs, exchange rates, and protectionist
practices.2 They have described how multinational corporations dictate
what initiatives states should pursue.' And they have noted how most
2

Gerald Epstein, "International Capital Mobility and the Scope for National Economic
Management," in Robert Boyer and Daniel Drache, eds., States against Markets (London:
Routledge, 1996), 211-24; Kenichi Ohmae, "The Rise of the Region State," foreign Affairs (Spring 1993): 78-87; Vivien Schmidt, "The New World Order, Incorporated,"
Daedalus 124 (1995): 75-106; Jan Aart Scholte, "Global Capitalism and the State," International Affairs 73 (1997): 427-52.
' Stephen Gill and David Law, The Global Political Economy: Perspectives, Problems
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states inevitably adopt neoliberal policies4 when addressing domestic
macroeconomic problems.5
Defenders of the nation-state have responded in kind. One such group
has argued that most exchange measures in fact remain under the control of states.6 A second group has forcefully argued for the increased
role states play in shaping the activities of corporations and international trade organizations.7 And a third group has argued that states
remain free to adopt unique solutions to unemployment, inflation, and
other related problems.8
Scholars considering the impact of regional and especially common
markets on nation-states have also been polarized in their conclusions
and selectively focused in their analyses. In their case, however, attenand Polices (New York: Harvester/Wheatsheaf, 1988); Matthew Horseman and Andrew
Marshall, After the Nation-State: Citizens, Tribalism and the New World Disorder (London: HarperCollins, 1994); Susan Strange, "The Defective State," Daedalus 124 (1995):
55-74.
4
John Meyer et al., "World Society and the Nation-State," American Journal of Sociology 103 (1997): 144-81; Wolfgang Wessels and Dietrich Rometsch, "German Administrative Interaction and European Union: The Fusion of Public Policies," in Yves Meny,
Pierre Muller, and Jean-Louis Quermonne, eds., Adjusting to Europe: The Impact of the
European Union on National Institutions and Policies (London: Routledge, 1996), 73109.
' Andrea Boltho, "Has France Converged on Germany? Policies and Institutions since
1958," in Suzanne Berger and Ronald Dore, eds., National Diversity and Global Capitalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 89-104; Hervez Dumez and Alain Jeunemaitre, "The Convergence of Competition Policies in Europe: Internal Dynamics and External Imposition," in Berger and Dore, eds., National Diversity and Global Capitalism,
216-38.
* Eric Helleiner, "Sovereignty, Territoriality, and the Globalization of Finance," in
David A. Smith, Dorothy J. Solinger, and Steven C. Topik, eds., States and Sovereignty in
the Global Economy (London: Routledge, 1999), 138-57; Paul Hirst, "The Global Economy: Myths and Realities," International Affairs 73 (1997): 409-25; Robert Wade,
"Globalization and Its Limits: Reports of the Death of the National Economy Are Greatly
Exaggerated," in Berger and Dore, eds., National Diversity and Global Capitalism, 6088.
Vincent Cable, "The Diminished Nation-State: A Study in the Loss of Economic
Power," Daedalus 124 (1995): 23-53; Eli Lauterpacht, "Sovereignty: Myth or Reality,"
International Affairs 73 (1997): 137-50; Saskia Sassen, "Embedding the Global in the
National: Implications for the Role of the State," in Smith, Solinger, and Topik, eds.,
States and Sovereignty in the Global Economy, 158-71; Linda Weiss, "Globalization and
the Myth of the Powerless State," New Left Review 24 (1997): 3-27.
s
Robert Boyer, "State and Market: A New Engagement for the Twenty-first Century,"
in Boyer and Drache, eds., States against Markets, 84-114; Ramesh Mishra, "The Welfare of Nations," in Boyer and Drache, eds., States against Markets, 316-33; Vivien
Schmidt, "Convergent Pressures, Divergent Responses: France, Great Britain, and Germany between Globalization and Europeanization," in Smith, Solinger, and Topik, eds.,
States and Sovereignty in the Global Economy, 172-92.
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tion has turned mostly to the ability of national executives (and not
legislators) to engage freely in decision making in international forums
devoted almost exclusively to trade. Those espousing a decline in state
control have hence argued, from neoinstitutionalist and functionalist
perspectives, that the supranational processes, rules, and structures of
those forums have pushed states into accepting undesired international
agreements.9 Those arguing otherwise — rational-choice theorists and intergovernmentalists — have instead argued that national preferences are
reflected in those agreements.10
A smaller set of scholars of regional and common markets has recently turned away from executive and legislative decision making in
selected areas and has generated more ambivalent conclusions about
the autonomy of nation-states. The works of Burley and Mattli" and
Guibernau,12 with their respective focus on judges' autonomy and regional decentralization, are important examples of partial judicial and
institutional transformations affecting nation-states. In the same spirit,
Meny et al." observe a partial "fusion" of national governmental structures as they cooperate in their effort to implement EU legislation. Mair
and Falkner14 in turn note changes in national party systems, linkages
between political representatives and private-sector players, and others
spheres of the political system.
These works tend to offer sophisticated assessments of state autonomy. Still, they do not concern themselves with the impact of suprana' Ernst B. Haas, "International Integration: The European and the Universal Process,"
International Organization 15 (1961): 366-92; Paul Pierson and Stephan Leibfried, eds.,
European Social Policy: Between Fragmentation and Integration (Washington, DC: The
Brookings Institution, 1995); George Ross, Jacque Delors and European Integration
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); Anne-Marie Slaughter, "The Real New
World Order," Foreign Affairs 76 (1997): 183-97.
10
Geoffrey Garrett, "The Politics of Maastricht," Economics and Politics 5 (1993):
105—24; Alan Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State (London: Routledge,
1992); Andrew Moravscik, "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach," Journal of Common Market Studies 31 (1993):
473-524.
11
Anne-Marie Burley and Walter Mattli, "Europe before the Court: A Political Theory
of Legal Integration," International Organization 47 (1993): 41-76.
'- Montserrat Guibernau, Nations without States: Political Communities in a Global
Age (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999).
" Yves Meny, Pierre Muller, and Jean-Louis Quermonne, eds., Adjusting to Europe:
The Impact of the European Union on National Institutions and Policies (London: Routledge, 1996).
14
Peter Mair, "The Limited Impact of Europenon National Party Systems," West European Politics 23 (2000): 27-51; Gerda Falkner, "Public-Private Networks in a Multi-Level
System: Convergence Towards Moderate Diversity," West European Politics 23 (2000):
95-120.
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tional economies on the decision making autonomy of national legislators in all areas of social life.15 Yet such an analysis seems warranted.
Legislatures have been at the heart of the nation-state for centuries. As
Weber himself argued, legislatures have had the fundamental task of
regulating the relationships between civic society and public authority,
and between elements of civic society.16 Locke, in his Second Treatise of
Government, thought of the legislature as "the soul that gives form, life,
and unity, to the common-wealth."17 Generations of writers thereafter
echoed his sentiments.18
Common to all traditional characterizations of the legislature has
been its freedom from both other branches of government, such as the
judiciary or executive, and nonstate forces, such as supranational organizations. In the words of Locke, "in all cases, whilst the government
subsists, the legislative is the supreme power: for what can give laws to
another, must needs be superior to him."19 Such freedom, moreover, has
always been interpreted as crucial to modern, democratic states. It has
been ensured through two venues. First, as pluralists and liberal theorists have emphasized, elected representatives have owed their positions
to the populace (or some of its segments) rather than members of the
executive or judiciary.2" Second, as statists and institutionalists have argued, the domestic legal structures and institutional arrangements that
legislators inhabit have themselves been largely insulated from external
factors.21
Common markets risk, in principle, making the historical autonomy
" A few works on the overall autonomy of national legislatures exist. However, they
focus exclusively on the EU and tend to assume, rather than analyze, the notion that
legislatures have lost much power to supranational decision-making bodies in order to
discuss ways to compensate for such a loss. See Tapio Raunio, "Always One Step Behind?
National Legislatures and the European Union," Government and Opposition 34 (Spring
1999): 180-202; Tapio Raunio and Simon Hix, "Backbenchers Learn to Fight Back: European Integration and Parliamentary Government," West European Politics 32 (2000):
142-68; Vivian A. Schmidt, "European 'Federalism' and its Encroachments on National
Institutions," Publius: The Journal of Federalism 29 (Winter 1999): 19-44.
" Weber, Economy and Society, vol. 2, chap. 9; vol 3, chaps. 10-13; Theda Skocpol,
"Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research," in Peter B.
Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 3-37.
17
John Locke, Second Treatise of Government (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1980), 107-8.
18
Lauterpacht, "Sovereignty: Myth or Reality," 138.
" Locke, Second Treatise of Government, 78.
20
Robert A. Dahl, Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy: Autonomy versus Control (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1982); Moravcisk, "Preferences and Power."
21
Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In"; Sven Steinmo, Taxation and Democracy:
Swedish, British, and American Approaches to Financing the Modern State (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1993).
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of national legislatures a thing of the past. These markets require that
the four basic elements of any economy —goods, labor, services, and
capital — circulate free from tariff and nontariff barriers. They also impose a Common External Tariff (CET): a single tariff barrier vis-a-vis
the outside world preventing any one participant from having special
access to external resources. To realize these objectives, common market
officials promulgate obligatory laws intended for faithful adoption into
national legal systems. These laws, as Mercosur's constitution and the
European Court of Justice have made clear, supercede any competing
national law:
The Common Market Council will promulgate Decisions, whose adoption
will be obligatory for the Member States. . . . The Common Market Group
will promulgate Resolutions, whose adoption will be obligatory for the
Member States. . . . the Member States agree to undertake any measure
necessary to ensure, in their respective countries, the realization of Mercosur norms. (Articles 9, 15, and 38 of the Protocol of Ouro Preto of 1995)
By contrast with ordinary international treaties, the EEC Treaty has created
its own legal system which, on the entry into force of the treaty, became an
integral part of the legal systems of the member states and which their
courts are bound to apply. . . . the executive force of Community law cannot vary from one state to another in deference to subsequent laws. (Case
6/64, Costa vs. ENEL, [1964] ECR 1141)22
National legislatures do not participate in any of the steps required for
the production of these laws. Sets of appointed national representatives
belonging to the executive branches of their governments or outright
members of supranational bodies, such as the European Commission,
control the process instead.2' Pushed outside of the deliberative space in
which common market laws are formulated, domestic legislators have
had to accept passively the resulting principles and play an administrative or executive role for transposition and application. That the principles of common market laws may coincide with national interests (and
thus strengthen states in certain ways) of course in no way renders the
bypassing of the national legislature any less real. The transformation of
national legislatures into obsolete or simply executive entities, and their
22

R. H. Folsom, R. B. Lake, and V. P. Nanda, European Union Law after Maastricht: A
Practical Guide for Lawyers Outside the Common Market (The Hague: Kluwer Law

International, 1996), 23-26.

23
All EU national legislatures have established European Affairs Committees. In most
countries, these only advise national executives on how to vote on EU law. Denmark is
the only country where the committee enjoys, and systematically exercises, the right to
instruct national executives. Recent changes to the EU treaties have increased information
exchanges between national legislatures and EU institutions without, however, granting
legislatures more power.
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de facto abdication of legislative power to representatives of the executive branch working at the supranational level or to outright supranational actors, are bound to happen even when national interests are
served.
Yet loss of autonomy by national legislatures has not been pervasive.
Such a situation would have occurred only in cases where common markets produced laws so comprehensive and powerful that they would
replace national authority in every area. We know, from any cursory
review of these laws, that this has not happened. But we know little
about the changes that have occurred.

MEASURING THE AUTONOMY OF NATIONAL LEGISLATURES
IN COMMON MARKETS
We may state that national legislatures lose most autonomy in those
legislative arenas where common market law has intruded the most. In
those arenas, the presence of common market law has made national
legislative actors and institutions irrelevant, except perhaps for executive purposes. Legislative arenas represent distinct spheres of social actions or the world, such as the environment or industrial production,
which are subject to regulation. Arenas can be broken down into legislative "fields" to gain additional specificity.
We can identify approximately 25 major arenas comprising 106 fields
representing all areas of traditional national legislative activity.24 Table
7.1 identifies the arenas and the associated fields. Legislative intrusion
refers to the presence of common market law in any one of these fields.
Intrusion varies in intensity. It is precisely such variation that we are
interested in measuring. Intensity levels may be said to vary across fields
as a function of coverage and depth.
Coverage concerns the volume of affected parties, activities, or processes that, out of the total potential volume in a given field, is being
targeted by common market laws: Of all parties, activities, or processes
belonging to this field, what proportion is being targeted by common
market law? To arrive at an understanding of the coverage of a field,
each law affecting a given field can be measured in terms of its breadth:
specific, broad, or comprehensive. Specific laws target very few of all
24
This is meant to be a comprehensive list of fields and arenas; it is thus based upon,
but goes beyond, the list that officials from the EU adopt when classifying existing EU
legislation and that scholars rely upon when examining existing common market legislation only; see, for example, Neil Fligstein and Jason McNichol, "The Institutional Terrain
of the European Union," in Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet, eds., European Integration and Supranational Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 59-91.
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TABLE 7.1
Identification of Legislative Arenas and Fields Historically Controlled by
Nation-States
2. Agriculture

1. Customs
A.
B.
C.
D.

Classification
Tariffs
Nontariffs
Border inspection
procedures

A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

A. Aid
B. Private unfair practices
(monopolies, dumping,
price fixing, etc.)
C. Public unfair practices
(ibid.)
D. Public enterprises

11. External Relations
A. International
representation
B. Development aid
C. International
agreements

A. Coal (production, aid,
prices)
B. Electricity
C. Nuclear
D. Oil & gas
E. Other sources

Health & safety
Information
Economic protection
Rights

21. Undertakings
A. Company law
B. Intellectual property
C. Economic 6c commercial law

A. Direct (personal,
organizational)
B. Indirect (personal,
organizational)

13. Industrial Policy
A. Classification
B. Manufacturing
standards
C. Sectoral intervention
D. Cooperation
18. Science, R&D,
Information

17. Public Health
A.
B.
C.
D.

Protective measures
Intervention measures
Rights
Medical standards

22. Security Policy
A. Military
B. Crime & prosecution

Note: There are 25 arenas and 106 fields.

Classification
Catching restrictions
Processing restrictions
Subsidies
Third-country trade
8. Taxation

12. Energy

16. Consumers
A.
B.
C.
D.

A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

7. Competition

6. Transportation
A. Air (infrastructure,
safety, procedures)
B. Water (ibid.)
C. Land (ibid.)
D. General

Definitions
Production procedures
Subsidies
Third-country trade
Trade

3. Fisheries

A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

Focus
Funding
Standards
Statistics
Registration of products

23. Justice/Home Affairs
A.
B.
C.
D.

Civil code
Penal code
Court jurisdiction
Legal rights of
individuals
E. Contracts

L E G I S L A T U R E S IN C O M M O N

4. Labor 8c Social Policy
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.

Workers' rights (incl. movement)
Pensions
Unemployment
Migration
Children & disabled
Housing

Freedom of intervention
Exchange rates
Accounting methods
Bank operations
Main instruments

14. Regional Policy
A. Regional rights & responsibilities
B. Subsidies

19. Education
A. Primary & middle education
B. Minimum age
C. Higher education
D. Special programs
E. Safety
F. Professional degrees
24. Political System
A. Constitution
B. Party structure
C. Administrative practices & structure
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5. Services
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

9. Monetary Policy
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

MARKETS

Classification
Barriers
Internal & client procedures
State guarantees
Public contracts
10. Capital Movement

A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

Tariffs
Security
Stock markets
International investments
Other (real estate, assets, start-ups, etc/

IS. Environment
A. Air (pollution, protection)
B. Water (ibid.)
C. Land (ibid.)
D. Animals
E. Forests
F. General
20. Culture
A. Funding
B. Program content
C. Museums

25. Civic Life
A. Association
B. Religion
C. Property rights
D. Citizenship
E. People movement
F. Women's rights
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the potential targets; broad laws target a sizable amount of potential
targets, though they are short of covering the majority; comprehensive
laws target the majority of, if not all, targets. Together, the total number
of laws targeting a field and the breadth of each law provide us with a
good, though surely somewhat imprecise, understanding of the coverage
of common market law of any given field. We can then state that overall
wide coverage of a field occurs when more than 50 percent of possible
targets seem addressed, while overall narrow coverage occurs when less
than 50 percent of all targets seem to be addressed by common market
law. We then need to turn to depth to understand fully the intensity
level with which said laws reach into each field.
Depth refers to the level of control being exerted in a given field over
the targeted parties, activities, and processes: Does common market law
rely primarily on the principle of mutual recognition (i.e., states must
accept each other's regulatory frameworks), or does it assert genuine
regulatory requirements of its own? Again, we turn to individual laws
and consider three levels of depth, given their target: mostly recognition-related (for example, a law on dark chocolate asking member states
to accept each other's definitions of essential ingredients), partly recognition-related and partly regulatory (for example, a law on the training
of doctors specifying the content of courses on internal medicine but
asking that member states recognize as valid each other's courses on
dermatology), and mostly regulatory (for example, a law on corporate
taxation defining all different taxation levels). We then consider all laws
in a field and state that a field is subject to deep regulation when the
majority of affected targets seem subject to regulatory principles. A field
is subject to shallow regulation when the majority of affected targets are
subject to mutual recognition principles.25 As with coverage, we recognize the inevitably imprecise nature of the approach.
We will thus notice four types of possible intrusion in any given field
(see fig. 7.1). Heaviest intrusion will occur where wide coverage and
deep regulation are observable. Selective intrusion occurs as a result of
narrow coverage but deep regulation. Nominal intrusion occurs in cases
of wide coverage but shallow regulation. No intrusion occurs when coverage is narrow and regulation shallow, and nation-states retain most, if
not all, of their legislative autonomy.26 Secondary works interpreting the
legal texts will serve to substantiate the findings of the analysis.
25
For a potentially alternative method of measuring intensity, see Neil Fligstein and
Iona Mara-Drita, "How to Make a Market: Reflections on the Attempt to Create a Single
Market in the European Union," American Journal of Sociology 102 (July 1996): 1-33.
26
Throughout, we must of course remember that the absolute size of a field varies.
Similarly, we must also recall that the importance of fields for the nation-state varies as well.
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Figure 7.1. Possible intrusion levels in a given legislative field
The resulting analysis can be augmented by a study of the chronological order of intrusion. A sense of the timing of the targeting of different
fields may provide us with hints about future trends and, at a more
fundamental level, the overall logic driving common market law.
HYPOTHESES ON LEGISLATIVE INTRUSION
With insights from existing works on supranational economies and the
nation-state, we can generate initial hypotheses about the nature (intensity and chronological order) of legislative intrusion in common markets. Below are four hypotheses, ranging from full decline of national
legislative autonomy to full retention.
According to the first hypothesis, we should witness an irreversible
and thorough takeover of the activities of national legislatures on the
part of common markets. All fields most intimately related to free trade
and a common external tariff are probably targeted first, but heavy intrusion soon expands to all remaining fields as the initial objectives of
the project require, for their fulfillment, the realization of other objectives. The hypothesis states:
Hypothesis 1: Common markets begin with wide and deep legislation in
strictly economic fields related to the trade of goods, services, labor, and
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capital but, after some time, expand their activities into other, apparently unrelated, fields. The national legislature experiences a gradual,
continuous decline in most fields.
We can articulate a second, more moderate, hypothesis that begins
with the assumption that common markets are by nature economic
projects. As such, heavy intrusion may be expected to concern primarily
legislative fields directly related to economic activity: trade, industrial
production, movement of goods, and others. We should thus witness
the heavy targeting of economic fields over time, though this may decrease in intensity as the work nears completion. All other fields are
subject to milder forms of intrusion. The hypothesis states:
Hypothesis 2: Common markets begin and essentially end with wide
and deep legislative activity strictly in fields concerned with the trade of
goods, services, labor, and capital. The national legislature experiences a
gradual and continuous decline in those fields only.
The third, also moderate, hypothesis recognizes heavy and even selective intrusion in certain, unpredictable fields. The chronological order of
such targeting is unclear. A variety of plausible causes could drive such
a pattern, such as nation-states' reactions, spillover, supranational leadership, pressure from interest groups, international events, economic
and political crises, poor planning, or misguided beliefs. The hypothesis
states:
Hypothesis 3: Common markets produce wide and deep, or narrow and
deep, legislation in fields not necessarily related to the trade of goods,
capital, labor, and services. The pattern is unpredictable. There seems to
be no chronological order to intrusion.
The fourth hypothesis predicts nominal or no legislative intrusion in
all fields. There would be, accordingly, little chronological order to notice. The hypothesis states:
Hypothesis 4: Common markets produce little, if any, legislative output
that intrudes with national legislatures. Common market law addresses
only a very few fields and imposes mutual recognition. The national
legislature remains essentially in control. There will be no observable
order of legislative intrusion.
The next section turns to the European Union and Mercosur to investigate empirically the nature of common market law and, thus, the continuing relevance of national legislatures.
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EMPIRICAL FINDINGS: THE EUROPEAN UNION AND MERCOSUR
The European Union and Mercosur, even despite Argentina's recent
crisis, are the two most successful common markets in existence.27 They
are, at the same time, remarkably different in terms of geographic location, length of existence, number of participants, and levels of development. As such, they represent excellent case studies for the unveiling of
any general feature of common market law and for generating conclusions about the autonomy of legislatures in common markets.
The European common market began with the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) among France, Germany,
Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands in 1951. In 1957 the
same states signed the two Treaties of Rome establishing the European
Economic Community (EEC) (and hence formally asserting the goal of
creating a common market) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). The three treaties together gave birth to the European
Community (EC). Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom joined
the EC in 1973; Greece, in 1981; Portugal and Spain, in 1986; and
Sweden, Austria, and Finland in 1995. Additional treaties have over
time expanded the original mandates of the EC. In the most important
treaty since inception — the 1992 Treaty on European Union (or Maastricht Treaty) —the European Community renamed itself as the European Union.28 Today, the EU includes three broad "pillars" or areas of
activity: the common market itself, Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and Cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs (CJHA).
The European Union has depended on directives and regulations as
the main tools for attaining its common market objectives. Directives,
generally espousing important and wide-reaching principles, have required transposition and application.29 Regulations, typically more subject-specific in their scope, have merely required application.50 The
2
" Scholars and journalists alike have for some time admired Mercosur's ability to withstand crisis. For a discussion on Mercosur's survival of Brazil's currency devaluation of
1999, see Nicola Phillips, "Regionalist Governance in the New Political Economy of Development: 'Relaunching' the Mercosur," Third World Quarterly 22 (2001): 565-83.
'* For a history of the EU, see Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to
European Integration (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999); John Pinder, The European Union: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
2
' The CFSP and the CJHA rely on intergovernmental agreements. See article 249 of the
Treaty of the European Community.
'" The EU has also utilized decisions to achieve its goals. These, however, are in effect
administrative rather than legislative acts (e.g., the decision to initiate a pilot program)
and are thus not considered here.
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Commission, a supranational institution composed of twenty appointed
commissioners, has been the primary formulator and overseer of the
implementation of EU directives. The European Court of Justice, also a
supranational institution composed of fifteen appointed judges, has
been the primary interpreter and enforcer of EU law." The Council of
Ministers, an intergovernmental institution composed of national ministers, has had the role of approving legislative proposals. The European
Parliament, a supranational institution of directly elected members,
has increasingly played a role in the approval process of legislative
proposals.
Mercosur resembles the EU in its reliance on foundational treaties
and protocols for its design and objectives, and institutions and laws to
attain those objectives. The Treaty of Asuncion of March 26, 1991,
gave birth to Mercosur, with Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay
as its members. It envisioned that by December 31, 1994, a free trade
area for labor, services, goods, and capital would be established. After
this period, a common external tariff would be specified. The linear and
automatic tariff reduction for intra-area trade of goods did occur more
or less according to schedule and was partly responsible for an increase
in intra-area trade from U.S. $4 billion in 1990 to U.S. $17 billion in
1996. Various political and economic shocks, such as Brazil's currency
devaluation in 1999 and Argentina's economic crisis of late 2001 and
2002, have so far challenged, but not undermined, Mercosur's stability.
Intra-area trade, which reached a high of 19 percent of all member
states' exports in 1994, still accounted for 18 percent of all member
states' exports in 2001 (up from 12 percent in 1991).
The protocol of Ouro Preto of January 1, 1995, set out to define
Mercosur's institutional structure. The protocol establishes only intergovernmental institutions operating on a consensual basis. The Common Market Council (CMC), composed of the ministers of foreign
affairs and finance and the heads of state, is in charge of overall leadership and direction and enacts decisions. Like EU directives, these tend
to be more abstract and principled than other common market legislation and are to be transposed into national law (article 40, Protocol of
Ouro Preto). The Common Market Group (CMG) is composed of four
permanent members, the ministries of foreign affairs and the economy,
and national central bankers. As the main executive body, its function is
" Burley and Mattli, "Europe before the Court," 41-76; Rachel A. Cichowski, "Integrating the Environment: The European Court and the Construction of Supranational
Policy," Journal of European Public Policy 5 (1998): 387-405; Francis Snyder, "The Effectiveness of European Community Law: Institutions, Processes, Tools and Techniques,"
The Modern Law Review 56 (1993): 19-54.
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to ensure that the larger principles of the CMC's decisions are practically achieved. To do so, the CMG enacts resolutions, intended for
incorporation into national law as well.'2 Mercosur's Trade Commission
(MTC) aids the CMG in the areas of the trade of goods and customs
operations. The Joint Parliamentary Commission is composed of representatives from national legislatures, and its task is to ensure proper
acceptance of Mercosur law into national legal systems.
For the purposes of this study, I coded almost two thousand individual laws along the two critical dimensions — breadth and depth — for the
period between 1958 and 2000, with Mercosur beginning in 1991. The
EU accounts for over thirteen hundred directives and regulations, while
Mercosur accounts for over six hundred decisions and resolutions. Laws
not coded were repetitions, amendments, and laws in fields already
deemed to be under high intrusion." Laws affecting more than one field
were coded as such. I relied on the analysis of secondary works on
legislation in the EU and Mercosur to corroborate the results of the
coding.
The Targets and Intensity of Supranational Intrusion
The following tables report the results from the coding.34 Let us consider Mercosur first. Table 7.2 identifies the fields that have experienced
the most serious intrusion. Heaviest intrusion occurs in fields that we
may consider directly related to the trade of goods. Tariffs for goods
(IB), agricultural definitions and procedures (2A-B), and industrial classifications and standards (13A-B) have all experienced the production of
wide-reaching law rich with regulatory requirements. As Hargain, Duran Martinez, and other legal scholars already noted a few years ago,
we can now find definitions in Mercosur for a great number of fruits,
vegetables, and industrial products and processes.35 Resolution 74/93
thus specifies the essential characteristics of onions, resolution 83/93
12
Both decisions and resolutions become effective in Mercosur thirty days after the last
member state announces the adoption of the law in question (article 40, Protocol of Ouro
Preto).
" The number of EU and Mercosur laws coded would otherwise be significantly higher.
Note that the data was initially collected for a comparative study of the content of EU and
Mercosur law. See Francesco Duina, "Important but Not Pervasive: The Shared Limits of
Secondary Law in the Common Markets of Europe and South America," Current Politics
and Economics of Europe 10 (2001): 351-79.
14
Coding data are available upon request.
" Daniel Hargain, Circulation de Bienes en el Mercosur (Buenos Aires: B de R, 1999;
Augusto Duran Martinez, Estudios Juridico a Proposito de Mercosur (Montevideo: Ingranusi, 1999).
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TABLE 7.2
Mercosur — Legislative Fields under Heavy Intrusion
Quadrant I: Wide and Deep Mercosur Legislation
•
•
•
•

Customs: tariffs (IB)
Agriculture: definitions, production procedures (2A-B)
Industrial Policy: classification, manufacturing standards (13A-B)
Consumers: health 8c safety, information (16A-B)

categorizes different types of food additives, resolution 54/92 lays out
detailed toy safety requirements, and resolution 18/00 specifies the technical prerequisites of clinical thermometers.
The two remaining fields address consumer rights. These are still related, though perhaps not directly, to the trade of goods. Mercosur has
major laws consumer health and safety (16A) and consumer information (16B).36 Resolutions 123/96, 124/96, 125/96, and 127/96 provide
the architecture for a consumer's bill of rights. More specific laws, such
as resolution 66/93 on vegetable quarantines, impose modalities and
definitions for specific products. Note, therefore, that heavy intrusion
does not involve three of the four areas central to common markets:
services, capital, and labor.
Essentially all fields in which Mercosur has selectively intervened are
related to the trade of goods (see table 7.3). Three fields may be considered directly related: custom classification of goods (1A) and external
relations in the form of international representation and agreements for
the purposes of trade (HA, 11C). With decision 23/97 and resolution
32/93, for instance, Mercosur begins trade cooperation with the EU.
Other laws give Mercosur representation power with Canada, Bolivia,
Chile, and other South American countries.
Most of the remaining fields seem indirectly related to the trade of
goods. The transportation of goods (6A-C); the environment, specifically with regard to air (15A) and thus the polluting activities of manufacturers; unfair competitive practices (7B, 7C); and science-R&D-information standards, statistics, and product registration (18C, 18D, 18E)
are targeted. In the case of pollution, Mercosur has so far concentrated
on the automotive and oil and gas industries, asking manufacturers to
ensure that products do not pollute beyond certain limits and that combustibles comply with certain chemical properties. Resolution 36/94
specifies, for these purposes, acceptable combustibles. Decision 11/97 in
turn regulates the dumping of goods. Again, we notice no serious pres" Roberto Dromi, Cddigo del Mercosur (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Ciudad Argentina,
1996), 180-81.
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TABLE 73
Mercosur — Legislative Fields under Selective Intrusion
Quadrant II: Narrow but Deep Mercosur Legislation
• Customs: classification (1A)
• Labor Movement & Social Policy: workers' rights (4A)
• Transportation: air, water, land
(6A-C)
• Competition: private unfair practices, public unfair practices (7B-C)
• External Relations: international representation, international agreements
(11A, 11C)
• Environment: air (15A)
• Public Health: protective measures (17A)
• Science, R&D, Information: standards, statistics, registration of products
(18C-E)
• Undertakings: economic & commercial law (21C)
• Political System: administrative practices and structure (24C)

ence in fields related to services, capital, or labor, except for workers'
rights (4A), where Mercosur does define some social security rights
(health care above all, with decision 19/97) of workers residing outside
their home country. Interestingly, though, we note intervention in matters related to public health, an arena removed from commerce, to set
protective measures (17A) in airport and at borders in order to prevent
the spread of diseases (resolution 27/00).
With table 7.4 we enter the area of nominal intrusion: laws that barely
affect national norms by simply accepting the validity of foreign objects,
processes, degrees, and so forth. Here capital and labor make an appearance. International investments in fact receive some attention (10D),
as do people movement (25E) and higher education degrees (19C). Decisions 7/95 and 8/96, for instance, ask for the recognition, rather than
for the harmonization, of numerous types of higher education degrees,
making labor movement a little more of a reality. The remaining fields
address a mixture of topics: the penal code (23B), public health intervention measures (17B), certain forms of industrial intervention and cooperation (13C, 13D) and consumer protection and rights (16C, 16D).
Table 7.5 includes the majority of fields. All aspects of services (5)
remain untouched.' 7 Decision 13/97 merely reiterates Mercosur's intention of having a free market for services. Most aspects of capital are
'" The coding thus confirms existing observations by specialists in this area. See Eva
Holz, La Integration de los Sistemas Bancarios (Montevideo: Fundacion de Cultura Universitaria, 1997), 25-26.
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TABLE 7.4
Mercosur — Legislative Fields under Nominal Intrusion
Quadrant III: Wide but Shallow Mercosur Legislation
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Customs: border inspection procedures (ID)
Capital: international investments (10D)
Industrial Policy: sectoral intervention, cooperation (13C-D)
Consumer: economic protection, rights (16C-D)
Public Health: intervention measures (17B)
Education: higher education (19C)
Justice, Home Affairs: penal code (23B)
Civic Life: people movement (25E)

unaffected.'8 Labor, and with it social policy, is unaffected when it comes
to most categories (4B-F).W The same may be said of fiscal (8), civic
(25A-D, F), and political (24A-B) matters.40
We may synthesize our findings by stating that Mercosur has heavily
or selectively intruded in fields directly related and indirectly related to
the trade of goods. Fields related to labor and capital have been mildly
targeted or simply ignored. Services and social, cultural, political, and
defense matters have been the least targeted.
Let us now turn to the European Union. Tables 7.6-7.9 show the
intensity of EU law in different fields. As was the case with Mercosur,
many of the fields experiencing heavy legislative intrusion (table 7.6)
can be considered directly related to the trade of goods. These include
customs (1), product classification and manufacturing standards (13AB), agriculture (2), production procedures for fisheries (3C), and political representation in the form of international trade agreements (11C).
Michael Mann observed this concentration of EU legislation around the
trade of goods a few years ago: "The content of European law, especially of the secondary law, overwhelmingly concerns the EEC's two
original purposes: trade liberalization and production integration and
standardization. It regulates in great detail the nature of commodities
bought and sold in the Community."41 A great number of industrial
products and procedures, consumer products, agricultural procedures,
18
One exception could be resolution 53/20 on minimal steps banks must take to prevent money laundering (field 10B).
" Maria Carmen Ferreira and Julio Ramos Olivera, Las Relaciones Laborales en el
Mercosur (Montevideo: Fundacion de Cultura Universitaria, 1997).
"" The coding confirms Dromi's observations from a few years ago. See Dromi, Codigo
del Mercosur, 185.
41
Michael Mann, "Nation-States in Europe and Other Continents: Diversifying, Developing, Not Dying," Daedalus 122 (1993): 115-39.
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TABLE 7.5
Mercosur — Legislative Fields under No Intrusion
Quadrant IV: Narrow and Shallow Mercosur Legislation
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Customs: nontariff barriers (1C)
Agriculture: subsidies, third-country trade, trade (2C-E)
Fisheries: all (3)
Labor & Social Policy: pensions, unemployment, migration, children/disabled,
housing (4B-F)
Services: all (5)
Transportation: general (6D)
Competition: aid, public enterprises (7A, 7D)
Taxation: all (8)
Monetary Policy: all (9)
Capital Movement: tariffs, security, stock markets, other (10A-C, 10E)
External Relations: development aid (11B)
Energy: all (12)
Regional Policy: all (14)
Environment: water, land, animals, forests, general (15B-F)
Public Health: rights, medical standards (17C-D)
Science, R&D, Information: focus, funding (18A-B)
Education: primary & middle, minimum age, special programs, safety, professional degrees (19A-B, 19D-F)
Culture: all (20)
Undertakings: company law, intellectual property (21A, B)
Security Policy: all (22)
Justice, Home Affairs: civil code, legal rights of individuals, court jurisdiction,
contracts (23A, 23C-E)
Political System: constitution, party structure (24A-B)
Civic Life: association, religion, property rights, citizenship, women's rights
(25A-D, 25F)

vegetables, and fruits are thoroughly regulated. Thus, directive 2001/110
and regulation 136/66 set stringent labeling and ingredient requirements
for honey and olive oil, respectively.
The majority of the remaining fields deal indirectly with the trade of
goods. We see legislation on science-R&D-information statistics (18D),
land transportation (6C), the environment (15A-B), and consumer
health & safety and information (16A-B). Thus, with directive 2000/29,
for example, the EU establishes measures to protect plants from harmful organisms in order to increase yields and agricultural productivity,
and with directive 70/220 emission requirements for motor vehicles are
set.
Differently from Mercosur, however, we also notice heavy legislation
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TABLE 7.6
EU — Legislative Fields under Heavy Intrusion
Quadrant I: Wide and Deep EU Legislation

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Customs: all (1)
Agriculture: all (2)
Fisheries: processing restrictions (3C)
Labor & Social Policy: workers' rights, migration (4A,4D)
Services: barriers (5B)
Transportation: land (6C)
Competition: private unfair practices, public unfair practices
(7B-C)
Monetary Policy: intervention, exchange rates, instruments (9A-B, 9E)
External Relations: international agreements (11C)
Industrial Policy: classification, manufacturing standards (13A-B)
Environment: air, water (15A-B)
Consumers: health & safety, information (16A-B)
Public Health: protective measures (17A)
Science & R&D: statistics (18D)
Undertakings: company law, intellectual property (21A-B)
Civic Life: people movement (25E)

in the area of labor, especially workers' rights (4A) and migration (4D).
Directive 92/85 on the safety and health rights of pregnant workers,
and a number of directives and regulations (such as regulation 1408/71)
granting migrant workers with jobs the right to enjoy social security
benefits, are good examples.42 Again differently from Mercosur, we note
the removal of formal barriers for services (5B) and, related to services,
substantial principles around intellectual property (21B). The remaining
fields include monetary policy — especially in the areas of intervention
(9A), exchange rates (9B), and various instruments such as interest rates
(9E). Regulation 1467/97, for example, specifies the meaning and acceptability of excessive budget deficits, while regulation 1466/97 reiterates the convergence criteria for monetary union.43 Capital is by contrast not heavily regulated at the EU level. We do notice, in the realm of
company law (21 A), some principles on minimum capital requirements
for investment firms (directive 96/3). But such laws are the exception
rather than the norm.
42

See Nicole Busby, "Division of Labour: Maternity Rights Protection in Europe," Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 22 (2000): 277-94.
43
Principles found in treaties and agreements also specify terms of supranational intrusion in monetary policy. My approach may thus not capture the full degree of lost autonomy by national legislatures.
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TABLE 7.7
EU — Legislative Fields under Selective Intrusion

Quadrant II: Narrow but Deep EU Legislation
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Fishing: catching restrictions and subsidies (3B, 3D)
Services: classification (5A)
Transportation: air, water, general (6A-B, 6D)
Competition: aid, public enterprises (7A, 7D)
Taxation: indirect (8B)
Monetary: bank operations (9D)
Capital Movement: tariffs, stock markets (10A, IOC)
External Relations: international representation (11A)
Industrial Policy: sectoral intervention, cooperation (13C-D)
Environment: animals, forests (15D-E)
Consumers: economic protection, rights (16C-D)
Public Health: intervention measures (17B)
Science & R&D: standards, registration of products (18C, 18E)
Education: higher education, professional degrees (19C, 19F)
Undertakings: economic and commercial law (21C)
Justice, Home Affairs: penal code, legal rights of individuals (23B, 23D)
Civic Life: women's rights (25F)

Table 7.7 includes a large number of fields indirectly related to the
trade of goods: air and water transportation (6A-B), consumer protection (16C), certain rights of individuals purchasing consumer products
(16D), science and R&D standards (18C), and product registration
(18E). Hence, with the important directive 99/44, for example, the EU
grants guarantees and warranties to consumers.44 Again differently from
Mercosur, we do observe an effort to classify some services (5A). In the
areas of labor, we see a parallel effort at standardizing the preparation
of a few higher education and professional degrees (19C, 19F). Directives 84/253 and 80/155, setting standards for certificates for accountants and midwives, respectively, offer good examples. Capital appears
here as well: aspects of capital investments related above all to movement are targeted (10A, IOC), making the free circulation of investments more of a reality. Hence, directive 79/279 harmonizes the conditions for admission of securities into stock exchanges. Certain aspects of
bank operations (9D) are also affected. Directive 86/635, for example,
harmonizes the content and form of consolidated accounts of banks and
other financial institutions.
The EU seems careful about targeting fields with mutual-recognition
44

Jennifer Hamilton and Ross D. Petty, "The European Union's Consumer Guarantees
Directive," Journal of Public Policy and Marketing 20 (2001): 289-96.
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TABLE 7.8
EU — Legislative Fields under Nominal Intrusion

Quadrant III: Wide but Shallow EU Legislation
• Monetary Policy: accounting methods (9C)
• Energy: oil & gas (12D)
• Regional Policy: subsidies (14B)
laws (table 7.8), despite common belief that planners have more recently worked towards mutual recognition. Only a few fields appear
here. Regional subsidies (14B) are somewhat affected. Accounting methods (9C) are mutually recognized (though this might soon change with
monetary union). Energy, especially oil and gas, has been similarly targeted (12D). Hence directive 76/491 merely requests that states make
available information on crude oil and other petroleum prices but falls
well short of dictating how states should influence those prices.
In the EU, a number of aspects related to capital, services and labor
remain under the regulatory domain of nation-states (table 7.9). States
control most capital security matters (10B), the treatment of international investments (10D), and capital flows into areas such as real estate
and startups (10E). Most aspects related to the regulation of services —
client relations and internal procedures, state guarantees to service providers, the assignment of public contracts (5C-E) — are with some exceptions left untouched.45 As to labor, states continue to control benefits
(4B), unemployment compensation (4C), and the protection of children
and the disabled (4E). Expectedly, there is also no or only limited legislation on housing (4F), various aspects of civic life (25A-D), culture
(20), and numerous other areas related to politics, fiscal policy, and
social life. Again, as Mann once noted correctly, "there has been "no
attempt at social redistribution" in Europe. The EU also "does not cultivate a real sense of European identity or citizenship. . . . [European]
cultural identity exists alongside strong and enduring national loyalties."46
Some synthesis about the EU is hence possible. The EU has, like Mercosur, moved with strength in the trade of goods. Fields indirectly related to the trade of goods have also been powerfully targeted: these
include transportation, the environment, consumer rights, and many
more. The EU has only selectively targeted certain aspects of services,
41

One exception would be the EU's intervention in television broadcasting, where indeed some intervention in client-provider relationships is present (see, for instance, directive 89/552 and its requirements on the broadcasting of advertising and other matters).
4
* Mann, "Nation-States in Europe," 125, 126.
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TABLE 7.9
EU — Legislative Fields under No Intrusion

Quadrant IV: Narrow and Shallow EU Legislation
• Agriculture: trade (2E)
• Fisheries: classification, third-country trade (3A, 3E)
• Labor and Social Policy: pensions, unemployment, children/disabled, housing
(4B-C, 4E-F)
• Services: all but classification and barriers (5C-E)
• Taxation: direct (8A)
• Capital: security, international investment, other (10B, 10D-E)
• External Relations: development aid (11B)
• Energy: all but oil & gas (12A-C, 12E)
• Regional Policy: rights and responsibilities (14A)
• Environment: land, general (15C, 15F)
• Public Health: rights, medical standards (17C-D)
• Science & R&D: focus, funding (18A-B)
• Education: primary & middle, minimum age, special programs, safety, professional degrees (19A-B, 19D-F)
• Culture: all (20)
• Security Policy: all (22)
• Justice, Home Affairs: civil code, court jurisdiction, contracts (23A, 23C, 23E)
• Political System: constitution, party structure, administrative practices and
structure all (24)
• Civic Life: association, religion, property rights, citizenship (25A-D)

labor, and capital. The social, political, moral, defense, and educational
spheres of social life are largely left untouched.

The Chronology of Supranational Intrusion
A chronological examination of supranational legislative activity should
reveal additional insights into the specific nature of legislative intrusion,
especially its logic and possible future direction. Our main findings so
far — heavy or selective intrusion in fields related to the trade of goods
and of fields indirectly related to such trade in both Mercosur and the
EU — leads us to suspect a temporal connection between the two trends:
heavy or selective intrusion in the trade of goods leads to later heavy or
selected intrusion in indirectly related fields. We can test this supposition by identifying the period or periods in which the bulk of common
market law was produced for any field (directly or indirectly related to
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TABLE 7.10
Timing of Intrusion in Mercosur
Bulk of Legislation Passed
in 1990-1995
Customs: classification
(1A: 1993-94)
Customs: tariffs (IB: 1994)
Agriculture: definitions
(2A: 1994-95)
Agriculture: production procedures
(2B:1994-95)
External Relations: international
agreements (11C: 1992, 1994)
Industrial Policy: classification (13A:
1994-95)
Industrial Policy: manufacturing standards (13B: 1991-94)
Consumers: health & safety (16A:
1994)
Transportation: water (6B: 1994-95)
Transportation: land (6C: 1994-95)

Bulk of Legislation Passed
in 1996-2000
Competition: private unfair practices
(7B: 1996-97)
Competition: public unfair practices
(7C:1996-97)
Environment: air (15A: 1996-97)
Consumers: information (16B: 1996,
1998)
Science, R&D, Info: standards (18C:
1998-99)
Science, R&D, Info: statistics (18D:
1997-2000)
Science, R&D, Info: product registration (18E: 1996)
Undertakings: economic and commercial law (21C: 1996)

Note: Fields in bold characters are directly related to the trade of goods; remaining
fields are indirectly related.

the trade of goods) deemed to have experienced heavy or selective intrusion.47
Table 7.10 shows when individual fields were targeted for Mercosur
by considering the periods 1990-95 and 1996-2000. In the early period of 1990-95, Mercosur officials seem to have been predominantly
busy targeting areas directly related to the trade of goods (highlighted in
bold). Three additional fields indirectly related to such trade were also
targeted then: consumer health & safety, water transportation, and land
transportation. Attention turned to more of those fields in the period
between 1996 and 2000, when the environment and matters related to
science, R&D, and information were subject to a number of important
laws. Table 7.10 thus suggests that legislative intrusion in Mercosur has
indeed followed a progressive expansion of intrusive laws from fields
related to the trade of goods to fields related to spillover areas.
4
" Recall that individual laws were coded for coverage in terms of specific, broad, and
comprehensive, and for depth in terms of mutual recognition, mutual recognition and
regulatory, and regulatory. Thus periods of interest would be those in which, for a given
field, (a) several specific/broad and regulatory (rather than mutual recognition) laws were
enacted, or (b) a few broad/comprehensive and regulatory laws were enacted. One year
andfive-yearperiods are considered for Mercosur and the EU respectively.
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We can execute a similar analysis for the EU.48 In this case, of course,
the time span is wider, with the early period stretching from 1960 to
1980, and the later period from 1980 to 2000. Table 7.11 indicates a
clear, late expansion of EU legislation into fields indirectly related to the
trade of goods. Transportation, the environment, and various aspects of
science, R&D, and information were targeted with some intensity only
after 1980, probably as Delors pushed for the completion of the common market and the Single European Act of 1986 came into being. The
EU certainly continued its legislative activity in fields directly related to
the trade of goods during 1980-2000. It is clear, however, that, as with
Mercosur, EU law has involved a chronological expansion of intrusive
laws from fields related to the trade of goods to fields indirectly related
to such trade. We must now synthesize our findings for the EU and
Mercosur and articulate, if possible, conclusions about the current autonomy of national legislatures in common markets.

NATIONAL LEGISLATURES IN COMMON MARKETS
The national legislature has been an essential feature of the nation-state
for centuries. A review of the impact of common markets on such an
institution can help us assess the chances of its continued relevance in
the era of supranational economies. Our empirical findings for the EU
and Mercosur are similar, despite their differences in age, location,
levels of economic development, and size. Let us review these findings
and then ponder their implications for other spheres of state power.
Common market law is superior to national law. Its presence decommissions national legislatures. Ourfindingsindicate, however, that common market law concerns primarily legislative arenas and fields directly
related (such as industrial production) and indirectly related (such as
the environment) to the trade of physical goods. It concerns far less
services, capital, and labor, especially in Mercosur. It leaves all other
arenas and fields essentially untouched. Common market law, then,
causes the displacement of legislative authority in selective and fairly
unpredictable areas of social life.49 On the chronological side, a logic
seems apparent, but only as it concerns the trade of goods: once fields
directly related to such trade are targeted, other, indirectly related, fields
48
For secondary references on the timing of EU legislation in specific areas, numerous
sources abound. See, for example, Richard. L. Leonard, The Economist Guide to the
European Union (London: Profile Books, 1998); Folsom, Lake, and Nanda, European
Union Law after Maastricht.
"' Thus, only with the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997 did the EU recognize intervention
in the environment as an inevitable step toward the creation of a common market.
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TABLE 7.11

Timing of Intrusion in the European Union
of Legislation Passed
in 1960-1980
Customs: classification
(1A: 1965-70)
Customs: tariffs (IB: 1965-70)
Customs: border inspection procedures (ID: 1965-70)
Agriculture: definitions
(2A: 1960-80)
Agriculture: production procedures
(2B: 1975-80)
Fisheries: catching restrictions
(3B: 1975-80)
Competition: aid (7A: 1965-70)
Competition: private unfair practices
(7B:1960-70)
Competition: public unfair practices
(7C:1975-80)
Taxation: indirect (8B: 1975-80)
External Relations: international
agreements ((11C: 1970-80)
Industrial Policy: classification
(13A: 1970-80)
Industrial Policy: manufacturing standards (13B: 1970-80)

Environment: animals
(15D: 1975-80)
Consumer: health & safety
(16A:1975-80)
Consumer: information
(16B: 1975-80)
Science, R&D, and Information: standards (18C:1965-80)

Bulk of Legislation Passed
in 1980-2000
Customs: classification
(1A:1990-95)
Customs: tariffs (IB: 1990-95)
Customs: border inspection procedures (ID: 1985-90)
Agriculture: production procedures
(2B:1980-85)
Fisheries: catching restrictions
(3B: 1980-85)
Fisheries: processing restrictions
(3C:1980-90)
Competition: private unfair practices
(7B: 1985-95)
Competition: public unfair practices
(7C:1985-90)

Transportation: water (6B: 1980-90)
Transportation: land
(6C: 1990-2000)
Taxation: indirect (8B: 1990-95)
Environment: air (15A: 1980-90)
Environment: water (15B: 1980-90)
Consumer: health & safety
(16A: 1980-90)
Consumer: information
(16B: 1980-90)
Consumers: economic protection
(16C: 1980-90)
Science, R&D, and Information: statistics (18D:1990-2000)
Science, R&D, and Information:
product registration
(18E: 1990-2000)

Note: Fields in bold characters are directly related to the trade of goods; remaining
fields are indirectly related.
follow. The emerging trend, captured essentially by a combination of
hypotheses 1 and 3, is thus as follows: national legislative autonomy is
systematically lost in fields related to only one (trade of goods) of the
four main official objectives of common markets, and in fields indirectly
related to the trade of goods later in time. What does this mean for the
autonomy of national legislatures?
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First, we can state that national legislatures have been unquestionably
transformed. In some areas of law, we may no longer speak of free
domestic legislators dedicated, as pluralists and statists once proposed,
to the production of an integral legal system. Legislators have instead
become the executive arms, along with their national administrations,
of supranational bodies to be used for the execution of laws that no
longer reflect the resolution to conflicting national preferences pursued
democratically through domestic institutions. Our understanding of democracy and representation may thus need revisiting. But this is true for
only certain legislative fields — some of which, due to a potentially unforeseen spillover effect, the original planners of common markets did
not consider.
Second, we can claim that national legislatures nonetheless retain
control of several important legislative arenas. In some instances these
are clearly outside the realm of the objectives of a common market,
such as culture. But in other cases, as with certain aspects of services or
labor, for instance, they are close to the objectives of common markets.
This leads one to conclude that national legislatures control more, in a
sense, than what one would expect had objectives been pursued with
the same zeal throughout. We may even suggest that in fields of least
displacement national legislatures enjoy an increased sense of legitimacy, since absence of intrusion may in fact be interpreted as a sanctioning of national authority, in line with the principle of subsidiarity
espoused by EU officials. We can thus assert with confidence that the
national legislatures retain relevance in the contexts of both the South
American and the European markets.
The emerging trend may accordingly be described as a division of
labor between supranational and national authorities. Common markets reign supreme in certain areas. In other areas, markets and states
share authority. Yet in others, common markets make symbolic claims
only. In the remaining areas, national structures continue to have full
legislative clout. No sooner is this said than we begin to wonder about
the causes of such a pattern: might the observed division of labor one
day disappear if markets truly realize their purported end (as free trade
areas not only of goods but also of labor, services, and capital) and
spillover mechanisms continue their work? What does our analysis reveal about the logic, and thus future, of supranational legal activity?
Our third point concerns the causes and future of common market
law. Our findings reveal no evidence that a single logic drives the process of supranational legislative activity. The economic requirements of
common markets alone cannot explain why certain economic areas are
fully left alone and others mildly targeted, while certain noneconomic
areas undergo severe intrusion. Spillover effects as a form of internal
market logic hold explanatory power only once common market laws
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in certain economic areas are introduced. Other factors must therefore
be influencing the selection of targets. The commercial interests of certain elements within member states might explain the heavy targeting of
goods-related areas.50 The geopolitical utility of these markets, to prevent wars for instance,51 might also explain the focus on goods (the EU
started, after all, with an agreement on coal and steel). Public ownership of most crucial services, such as banking or energy, in key member
states, such as Brazil or France, might explain hesitance in the sphere of
services. In addition, other factors may explain, along with spillover,
why areas such as education (in the EU especially) and the environment
are targeted. One such factor might be the independent desire to create
a common citizenry.
No single factor is likely to explain the observed patterns of common
market law. Common markets reflect economic, social, and other considerations.52 There is therefore no reason to believe that observable
trends, depicting a mixed and somewhat disorderly division of labor
between national and common market structures, are to end in the foreseeable future. Simple claims of either inevitable decline or unperturbed
strength in various spheres of the nation-state, so common in the contemporary literature, are inapplicable in the realm of national legislative
activity.
New Opportunities for State Power
Given that the continued relevance of the nation-state, in its various
functions, is ultimately this volume's topic of interest, we might do well
to contemplate whether some decline in the power of traditional national legislative structures does not imply gained strength in other areas.
Other contributors to this volume, such as Grzegorz Ekiert, note that
loss of state power in some areas may, in some cases, translate into state
power in other areas. Can states assert their authority with all the more
power in other areas precisely because their national legislative branches
are becoming weaker?
50
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States can certainly increase their administrative strength while accepting common market law. The implementation of EU and Mercosur
law is left in the hands of nation-states. These must rely on administrative structures strong enough to ensure compliance with the adopted
principles. Where administrative units were previously absent, new
units emerge. The legitimacy of weaker administrations, such as in Italy
or Greece, is also bolstered, as the new mandates legitimize the exercise
of authority and the spirit of the law. The executive function of states
may thus strengthen as a result of participation in supranational markets.
The executive function may also gain power since members of the
executive branches make up the Council of Ministers in the EU and the
Common Market Council and Common Market Group in Mercosur.53
To the extent that these can be said to control the content of common
market law, we may state that members of national executives gain
strength as the legislative branch loses autonomy. But here we must
immediately remind ourselves of the fact that not all ministers of all
nations represented in these bodies have their way. German, French,
and Brazilian ministers may claim some advantage over national legislatures; the same may not be said as easily of Portuguese, Greek, or
Uruguayan ministers. Nation-states may also obtain further power if
supranational markets — in part because of their laws — offer them the
opportunity to obtain objectives otherwise beyond their reach. As Moravcsik suggests, this may indeed have occurred in the European Union,
whose existence has essentially served to promote the commercial power
of each member state.54 More conservative claims could be made about
the fact that the European Union and other supranational markets in
fact produce outcomes that strengthen some, rather than all, of their
member states. Enduring peace, otherwise less secure in a world without the European Union, also allows for the continuation of states as
we know them. European states, as Milward reminds us, risked extinction during World War II."
States may even be able to become powerful legislative agents in those
areas previously not subject to any type of legislative presence. Supranational law may, in fact, legitimize corollary or tangential national law in
spheres hitherto considered beyond the scope of national regulation.
Certainly, the limits and scope of such new intervention are set by the
" In certain countries, such as France, members of the executive can also be members of
the legislature. Yet their participation in supranational legislative processes is as members
of the executive.
54
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principles of common market law. This, however, may pose more opportunities than drawbacks from a legislative point of view. An analysis
of national legislative activity following the arrival of supranational law
would be needed to evaluate this thesis.
Finally, we must remember that states can always refuse to implement
common market law, in terms of both transposition into national law
and practical application. In a perverse way, this affords states, and
especially elements within a state, a chance to assert their viewpoints
and independence in the international arena. A look at the EU's implementation record indicates that refusal to implement is certainly pervasive.56 With the exception of Denmark, no EU member state could
boast, for instance, to have transposed more than 25 percent of the
Single European Act's directives on time.57
All of this points to a complex picture of state transformation in the
era of supranational economies. Rather than heralding either the death
of the nation-state or its unperturbed survival, we should examine with
care the intricate changes affecting the nation-state and their multiple,
contradictory implications for the various components of states. We
would also be wise to recall that states have never existed as a fixed
entity in history but have in fact been constantly evolving since their
inception.
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(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999).
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